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BOOK REVIEW
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
A BEAVER WITHOUT A DAM?
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT. Ottawa: International Development Research
Centre, 2001. xiii + 91.
THOMAS G. WEISS & DON HUBERT, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RE-
SEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND (SUPP. VOL. TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT). Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. xiv + 410.
Reviewed by Jeremy L Levitt*
The beaver's dam is comparable to protective intervention for at-risk
populations.' Beavers need dams to enlarge the underwater habitat that
will be open to them in winter, by creating a pond deep enough so that
the bottom will not freeze. Humanitarian corridors and safe havens serve
parallel functions for displaced civilians during times of conflict. Deep
water, whether it is due to a beaver dam or not, provides storage for win-
ter food and year-round underwater access to the den secure from
predators. The shelter and safety deep water provides can be likened to
the physical protection needed to safeguard civilians and aid convoys,
deliver humanitarian supplies, forcibly disarm belligerents, and shield
humanitarian workers during and after conflict. Increasing the area of the
pond through damming and additional downstream impoundments pro-
vides safer access to additional food supplies for beavers in the same
way that buffer or no-fly zones protect vulnerable civilians. The Respon-
sibility to Protect can be likened to the beaver because it seeks to build a
"dam of protection" through the actions of the international community,
to safeguard and preserve human life in nations whose governments fail
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law and Executive Di-
rector, Center on International Law, Policy and Africa. I kindly thank Thomas Weiss and
Richard A. Bilder for reviewing the final draft of this review. All shortcomings and/or hazy
metaphors are those of the author.
I. The beaver attained official status as an emblem of Canada, the birthplace of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), when an "act to
provide for the recognition of the beaver (castor canadensis) as a symbol of the sovereignty of
Canada" received royal assent on March 24, 1975. See Government of Canada, The Beaver, at
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/cpsc-ccsp/sc-cs/ol-e.cfm (last visited Nov. 23,
2003).
2. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY [CAN-
ADA], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT].
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to do so. Just as beavers without dams are more at risk of death and star-
vation during the winter season, people in areas of conflict that lack
buffer zones are similarly at risk year round. This analysis seeks to de-
termine whether the report adequately lays out a viable strategy for the
international community that complements, in human terms, the protec-
tive rationale or logic behind the beavers' dam, by providing a
framework for intervention to protect at-risk populations in such a man-
ner as to minimize human suffering and loss of life.
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the Responsibility to Protect report provide a new framework
or paradigm of protection for forging a new consensus to resolve the
long-standing dilemma of humanitarian intervention? If not, why not? If
so, does it proffer a viable response to United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) inconsistency, inaction, and ultimate neglect in countries such
as Liberia (1990); Burundi (1994); Rwanda (1994); the Central African
Republic (1996); Sierra Leone (1997); Guinea-Bissau (1998); Congo
(1998) Guinea (1999); and again in Liberia (2003), where the humanitar-
ian and political situation was arguably far more critical than in any
other country in the world?3 Does the Responsibility to Protect ade-
quately address the "authority" dilemma, when the UNSC sits idly by
and allows, as in the case of Rwanda, genocide and massive human
rights abuses to unfold before it? The analysis that follows addresses
these questions.
In the wake of the arguably illegal U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom
in April 2003, which toppled the repressive but internally stable regime
of Saddam Hussein, and general international neglect of and ambiva-
lence toward war-torn Liberia during the same period, there is no better
3. Liberia is a poor country under autocratic rule and violent siege by unruly rebels.
Since 1989, over 250,000 Liberians have been killed by civil conflict (I out 12 of the coun-
try's 3 million) and in the most recent surge of conflict I million Liberians have been
displaced, 300,000 have fled across international border as refugees into neighboring coun-
tries, and 50,000 refugees from Cote d' Ivoire and Guinea living in Liberia have been
disrupted. Moreover, the unemployment rate in the country is 85% and the 75% of the popula-
tion live below the poverty level. See Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm, ICG
AFRICA REPORT (International Crisis Group regional report), Apr. 30, 2003, available
at http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/report-archive/A400960_30042003.pdf (last
visited Dec. 8, 2003); LIBERIA: Police disperse youth protest against Taylor, Integrated Re-
gional Information Networks (a news service arm of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs) (July 3, 2003), at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=
35168&SelectRegion=West Africa&SelectCountry=LIBERIA (last visited Dec. 8, 2003);
Jeremy I. Levitt, It's Time America Comes to Liberia's Assistance, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 6,
2003, at 27A.
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time to discuss and consider the dynamic paradigm shift from "humani-
tarian intervention" or a "right to intervention," to the "intervention for
human protection purposes" proposed by the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in The Responsibility to
Protect. According to the report, the difference in terminology is more
than semantics; it speaks to the obligations, as opposed to rights, of
states and, in this context, the notion of sovereignty as responsibility.4 As
Thomas Weiss notes, the intention of the ICISS seems to be to "drive a
stake through the heart of the term 'humanitarian intervention.' "' The
author of this book review agrees with Weiss's assertion that
The shift in language is based on several assumptions, some
more sensible than others. The first, which is frankly the least
solid, is the allergy of many humanitarians to the term that they
consider an oxymoron. This self-righteous monopoly by civilian
agencies is hard to understand or tolerate because on many occa-
sions the military is the only way to halt atrocities; and many
members of the armed forces have certainly contributed substan-
tially to the humanitarian enterprise.6
Weiss's view, however, in no way implies that there are no valid rea-
sons for changing the facially presumptive and self-interested
terminology of humanitarian intervention to the "less controversy-ridden
vocabulary of the responsibility to protect," and thereby shifting the "de-
bate away from the rights of interveners to the rights of affected
populations and the obligations of outsiders to help. 7
The report seeks to answer one of the more controversial and com-
plex questions in international relations: whether states have a right of
intervention for humanitarian purposes, and if so, under what circum-
stances should it be exercised and under whose authority? This report
was born out of the challenge by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to avert
"another Rwanda" by forging a new consensus to the long-standing con-
troversy over humanitarian interventionS-urging member states to
4. FRANCIS DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY As RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT IN AFRICA XVii (1996).
5. Thomas G. Weiss, To Intervene or Not to Intervene? A Contemporary Snap-Shot,
CANADIAN FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 2002, at 141, 145. Thomas Weiss was Research Director to
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 146.
8. The report deliberately decided to employ the term 'intervention' as opposed to
'humanitarian intervention' in response "to the very strong opposition expressed by humani-
tarian agencies, humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers towards the
militarization of the word 'humanitarian."' THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2,
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formulate new approaches to responding to humanitarian crises-"to
find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and act-
ing in defence of our common humanity."9 In his April 3, 2000,
Millennium Report address to the General Assembly, Annan com-
mented:
We must protect vulnerable people by finding better ways to en-
force humanitarian and human rights law, and to ensure that
gross violations do not go unpunished. National sovereignty of-
fers vital protection to small and weak States, but it should not
be a shield for crimes against humanity.'0
In that same report, Annan posed a critical question to skeptics of in-
tervention: "[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebe-
nica-to gross and systematic violations on human rights that offend
every precept of our common humanity?""
Canada, led by its former foreign affairs minister, Lloyd Axworthy,
responded to Annan's compelling critiques and pleas by establishing the
International Commission on Intervention on State Sovereignty. The
ICISS was formally launched at the United Nations Millennium Summit
in September 2000 by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Annan
asked it:
[T]o wrestle with the whole range of questions-legal, moral,
operational and political-rolled up in this debate to consult
with the widest range of opinion around the world, and to bring
back a report that would help the Secretary-General and every-
one else find some new common ground.'2
The ICISS had three primary goals:
1) to promote a comprehensive debate around humanitarian in-
tervention; 2) to foster a new political consensus on how to
at 9. The report defines intervention as "action taken against a state or its leaders, without its
or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective." Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 2. See also Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Presents his
Annual Report to the General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM7136 (Sept. 20, 1999).
10. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, We the Peoples: Secretary-General's Statement to
the General Assembly (April 3, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/
sg/report/state.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
11. KOFI A. ANNAN, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
21 ST CENTURY 48 (United Nations Department of Public Information 2000).
12. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at vii.
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reconcile the principles relating to intervention and state sover-
eignty; and 3) [to] translate that consensus into action.'
3
It argues:
[S]overeign states have a responsibility to protect their own citi-
zens from avoidable catastrophe-from mass murder and rape,
from starvation-but that when they are unwilling or unable to
do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader commu-
nity of states.
4
The commission was co-chaired by Gareth Evans, former foreign minis-
ter of Austria, and Mohamed Sahnoun, senior Algerian diplomat and
senior advisor to the UN Secretary-General.' 5
In addressing the question of whether states have a right of interven-
tion for humanitarian purposes, under what circumstances, and under
whose authority, the ICISS report fashions an innovative response,
namely, that the international law principles of state sovereignty and
nonintervention in the internal affairs of states, on one hand, and the
emerging consensus on intervention for humanitarian protective pur-
poses, on the other, should be considered as complementary, not
contradictory. By redefining the notion of sovereignty as responsibility,
the report recasts the debate over humanitarian intervention, thereby re-
placing the notion of a "right to intervention" with a "responsibility to
protect." The report acknowledged:
[T]hat sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally-to
respect sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In in-
ternational human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state
practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this
dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the
minimum content of good international citizenship.'
6
The ICISS clearly considered intervention lawful and legitimate
when aimed at protecting people from human suffering on a grand scale.
For this reason the report is bold and innovative. Yet one wonders
whether the principles outlined in the commission's report present a bea-
ver without a dam-another framework lacking the theoretical vigor to
13. Jennifer Welsh et al., The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty, 57 INT'L J. 489, 490, 491 (2002).
14. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at viii.
15. See Welsh, supra note 13, for additional background information on the financing,
composition, and structure of the ICISS.
16. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at 8.
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forge new normative paths while simultaneously filling normative gaps,
particularly on the issue of "right authority."
The analysis that follows is divided into two sections. The first
briefly examines the metaphorical beaver-the core principles laid out in
the report. The second examines whether this beaver has created a "dam
of protection" by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the report's
"responsibility to protect" paradigm in light of the regional and interna-
tional law de lege lata, particularly in Africa, where the bulk of both UN-
and non-UN- sanctioned interventions have taken place.
A. The Beaver
This section highlights and examines the core principles outlined in
the ICISS report. That report is arguably the most progressive in a series
of governmental and nongovernmental (NGO) reports that have surfaced
over the past four years. 7 The ICISS report is both refreshing and stale;
notwithstanding, it is vital to the ongoing discussion on humanitarian
intervention. The report's vitality stems from its "fresh terminology and
clear ideas for reconciling conflicting principles"; its staleness results
from the report's inability to offer a genuine way to allay the quagmire
of UNSC inaction.
The report highlights two basic principles: (1) "State sovereignty
implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection
of its people lies with the state itself';'9 and (2) "Where a population is
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression
or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
community's responsibility to protect." 20
1. Basic Principles
The first of these principles echoes (without formally acknowledging)
arguments put forth by Francis M. Deng et al., the UN Secretary-
17. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
ISSUES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW [NETHERLANDS], HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
(2000); DANISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS (1999); INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
Kosovo, THE KoSovo REPORT (2002); ACADEMIC COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
(ACUNS), EMBRACING THE ELEPHANT: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
(2001) (Policy brief for the II th ACUNS/ASIL (American Society of International Law)
Workshop on International Organization Studies at the University of Namibia).
18. Edward Newman, Humanitarian Intervention, Legality and Legitimacy, INT'L J.
HUM. RTS., Winter 2002, at 102, 105 (reviewing four recent books, including THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT, related to the topic of Humanitarian Intervention).
19. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at xi.
20. Id.
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General's Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons,
namely that "It]he sovereign state's responsibility and accountability to
both domestic and external constituencies must be affirmed as intercon-
nected principles of the national and international order ... At the very
least that means providing for the basic needs of its people."2 When
states "fail to discharge this responsibility and refuse to call for help
even under those exceptional circumstances ... the international com-
munity can be expected to step in to provide remedies., 2' Although the
notion of sovereignty as responsibility did not arrive with the ICISS re-
port, The Responsibility to Protect has placed the concept squarely in the
global debate over the efficacy of humanitarian intervention. The report
argues for the "re-characterization" of sovereignty "from sovereignty as
control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and
external duties."23 Such a change in nomenclature shifts the focus of the
intervention debate from "the right to intervene" to "the responsibility to
protect," thereby changing the terminology and "reversing the percep-
tions inherent in the traditional language. 24 The report succeeds in
switching the emphasis from the intervening state(s) to at-risk popula-
tions, and in consequence from the right of the intervening state(s),
which casts the intervening state(s) in an aggressive light, to states' "duty
to protect communities from mass killing, women from systematic rape
and children from starvation. 25
The second principle is bold and definitive. Although the report "ac-
knowledges that the primary responsibility [to protect] ... rests with the
state concerned," it recognizes the duty of the international community
to protect people when the state is not able to do so, is unwilling to do
26
so, or is the main vehicle of oppression. To argue, as the report does,
that the principle of nonintervention (a jus cogens norm) "yields to the
international responsibility to protect," a customary international law
norm at best (as opposed to the pre-emtory nature of ajus cogens norm),
is daring as it elevates such a responsibility to a "duty" and anoints it
with a status that transcends the more well-established "right to interven-
tion" or humanitarian intervention. Moreover, it is unclear why the
ICISS seems to limit the report's focus to "internal war" and other inter-
nal state dynamics as opposed to interstate war, if the principle is
genuinely universal-meant to protect people in harm's way when a
state fails to do so. Although it is true that since the end of the Cold War
21. DENG, supra note 8, at xvii.
22. Id.
23. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at 13.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id.
26. Id.
Fall 20031
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the bulk of deadly conflict has taken place within state borders as op-
posed to between states themselves, internal conflict is rarely solely
internal and often is fueled by rival neighbors (e.g., Liberia's support of
rebels in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2002 and Guinea's and Crte
d'Ivoire's support of insurgents in Liberia between 1999 and 2003) or, as
William Reno has noted, by the transnational corporatist forces that
compose the "shadow state. 27 Despite the fact that the report too nar-
rowly focuses on internal conflict, a term that needs to be understood in
a new light given the internationalization, geopolitical aspects, and eco-
nomic nature of today's conflicts, its underlying principles surely were
meant to apply to interstate conflict as well.
2. Legal and Philosophical Foundation
The foundation of the "responsibility to protect" rests on four major
pillars: (1) "obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty"; (2) "the
responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Char-
ter, for the maintenance of international peace and security"; (3)
"specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection
declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and
national law"; and (4) "the developing practice of states, regional organi-
zations and the Security Council itself.' 28 Few states would quarrel with
the first three of these pillars; however, the fourth one is more controver-
sial and requires further analysis. Depending on how one weighs and
interprets the developing practices of regional organizations and UNSC
responses to such practices, one may argue that the "responsibility to
protect" has already attained normative status. The trend of unilateral
intervention (without prior UN authorization) by states and regional or-
ganizations in Africa,29 particularly the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and its Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) (see Table I), coupled with the new interventionist law of
the African Union (AU), supports the notion of the existence of the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention.
27. See WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES (1999).
28. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at xi.
29. In this instance, the term 'unilateral intervention' is being used to mean an interven-
tion taken outside of the UN Charter framework rather than one taken by one state.
[Vol. 25:153
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TABLE I: AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
Selected African Military Interventions, 1990-2003
GROUP PLACE OF YEAR OF LENGTH OF
INTERVENTION INTERVENTION MISSION*
ECOMOG' Liberia 1990 8 years
MISABb Central African 1997 9 months
Republic (CAR)
ECOMOG Sierra Leone 1997 2 years
ECOMOG Guinea-Bissau 1998 1 year
SADCc  Lesotho 1998 1 month
ECOMOG C6te d'lvoire 2003 Present
ECOMIL' Liberia 2003 Present
Nonhumanitarian Legal Forcible Military Interventions
by Individual African States
GROUP PLACE OF YEAR OF LENGTH OF
INTERVENTION INTERVENTION MISSION*
Nigeria' Sierra Leone 1997 3 months
Senegal Guinea-Bissau 1998 6 months
Guinea Guinea-Bissau 1998 6 months
*This is a conservative estimate because the ECOWAS and MISAB missions were later
converted into UN-sanctioned operations.
Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
Mission for the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB)
'South African Development Community (SADC)
'ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)
Nigerian Forces Assistance Group (NIFAG)
An intervention norm by its very nature clashes with traditional no-
tions of nonintervention as enumerated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
but it is nonetheless "legally oxidized" by the UNSC's consistent prac-
tice of retroactively authorizing otherwise illegal (under UN law) African
interventions. In effect, it is UNSC practice that is chiseling away at,
first, the mantle of state sovereignty by sanctioning humanitarian inter-
ventions, even those taken outside of its authority, and second, the UN
Charter principle of nonintervention, by ex post facto authorizing such
interventions. The ICISS report claims that the developing practice of
states, regional organizations, and the UNSC is one of the foundations
upon which the "responsibility to protect" lies, but the report ultimately
fails to quantify in legal terms the impact of African interventions on the
law de lege lata when considering the issue of "right authority."
Fall 2003]
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3. Sovereign Responsibilities
The report embraces three very important responsibilities: to pre-
vent,30 to react, 3' and to rebuild. 32 These responsibilities are not new. But
for the terminology, they contextually mirror the better-known concepts
of conflict prevention, management, and resolution that are found in
many regional conflict maintenance systems, particularly in Africa.3
From this background, states already have a wealth of experience con-
structing and operating conflict systems that embrace the responsibilities
to prevent, react, and rebuild (see Table II), a fact that further reinforces
the soundness of the ICISS's approach to peacemaking.
30. "[T]o address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other
man-made crises putting populations at risk." THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2,
at xi.
31. "[T]o respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures,
which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in
extreme cases military intervention." Id.
32. "[T]o provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recov-
ery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was
designed to halt or avert." Id.
33. See, e.g., Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on
the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management
and Resolution, Assembly of Heads of States and Government, 29th Ordinary Sess., OAU
Doc. AHG/DECL.3(xxix) (1993), available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official-
documents/Heads%20of%20State%20Summits/hog/3HoGAssembly1993.pdf (last visited Jan.
15, 2004), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND
SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AND JUDICIAL ISSUES 219 (Jeremy I. Levitt ed., 2003)[hereinafter
AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS]; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union, Assembly of the African Union, 1st Ordinary
Sess. (2002), available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/Treaties-%20
Conventions_%20Protocols/Protocolpeace%20and%20security.pdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2004) [hereinafter AU Protocol]; Protocol Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, and Resolution, and Peace-keeping, and Security, Dec. 10, 1999,
available at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/apl01299.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2004), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra, at 259 [hereinafter ECOWAS
Mechanism]; Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Region, I I AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 197 (1999) [hereinafter SADC
Mechanism].
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Few would contest the importance of the responsibilities to prevent,
react, and rebuild, and the holistic framework the commission sets out to
deal with deadly conflict; however, the report's approach raises some
important questions. As noted above, why does the responsibility to pre-
vent seem to focus solely on "the root causes and direct causes of
internal conflict," as opposed to including those causes of interstate con-
flict as well? In addition, the report does not clarify how these three
responsibilities should conjoin and/or interact. In the real world, each
principle requires a different set of operating systems that are intercon-
nected or linked to one another. Alternatively stated, although these
principles seem to establish the notion of a continuum of responsibility,
how will they work together in practice? How does one begin to do "root
cause prevention" without examining the structural model behind con-
temporary governance systems (i.e., the tripartite Westphalia state
model)?
The ICISS acknowledges that preventive strategies "must work to
promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political
arrangements in which all groups are represented," but it does not
address the issue of the framework or structure of representation.34
Western models of governance were superimposed through colonialism
on the majority of states in the international system with little
consideration of preexisting indigenous political structures. Westphalia-
based Western models of governance may be simply too contrary to
traditional law systems, under which the majority of people of the
developing world live, and that such models may serve as incubators for
conflict in societies where the political culture has not changed from
decentralized and even acephalous modes of organization. It has been
argued that "the most distinctive contribution of Africa to the history of
humanity has in fact been the civilized art of living in a reasonably
peaceful way without a State.."35 These last two points are important
because in the same way that Western governance systems have failed to
establish and maintain democratic order and peace in certain states and
regions, conventional state-centric remedies designed for such systems
(i.e., to prevent, react, and rebuild) have not adequately considered the
dynamics of traditional sociopolitical environments-environments that
may require a paradigmatic approach "below" the trajectory of
sovereignty as responsibility. What is needed is an approach that not
only seeks to make the state accountable to people but also makes people
accountable to themselves, because the vast majority of people in the
34. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at 22-23.
35. JEAN-FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY 35
(1993) (citing J. Lonsdale).
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developing world, where the bulk of conflict takes place, have limited
contact with and know little about their own rights, privileges, and duties
on one hand and about national governments on the other. By
themselves, top-down, state-centered approaches-whether "a right to
intervention" or "a responsibility to protect"-do not adequately
consider the bottom-up contingent factors in root cause prevention.
The ICISS report argues that prevention is the "single most impor-
tant dimension of the responsibility to protect" and that the
"responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less in-
trusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive
and intrusive ones are applied."3 6 This assertion is perplexing given that
the aim of the report is to seek new ways to "respond" to preexisting
humanitarian crises and protect vulnerable populations. Prevention
would require powerful states to invest in early-warning systems, pre-
ventive deployment missions, and other forms of institution building in
volatile states and zones of conflict where they have no overwhelming
national interest. As the report notes, doing this would require the inter-
national community to "change its basic mindset from a 'culture of
reaction' to that of a 'culture of prevention.' ,7 How can such a change
be implemented? How long will it take before such a change occurs? Until
it does, there is a need to forge consensus on the issue of intervention, as
the people of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and beyond need a "dam" today.
II. WITH OR WITHOUT A DAM?
This section examines whether the Responsibility to Protect para-
digm offers a holistic, legitimate, and acceptable approach to
protecting at-risk populations-whether it establishes a pragmatic ap-
proach to "dam building" when people face actual or possible large-
scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing and their governments are unable
or unwilling to protect them.
The most important part of the ICISS report may be found in chap-
ters 4 to 7, appropriately titled the Principles for Military Intervention. In
these chapters the report proffers "just cause" thresholds and "precau-
tionary principles," and discusses the issues of "right authority" and
"operational principles." The "just cause" thresholds and "right author-
ity" principles are the most important and controversial.
The ICISS contends that exceptions to the principle of non-
intervention should be limited and that "[m]ilitary intervention for
36. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at xi.
37. Id. at 27.
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human protection purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and ex-
traordinary measure" that should be warranted only when "serious and
irreparable harm [is] occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to
occur."38 According to the report, the just cause threshold for military
intervention for human protection purposes is met when states seek to
halt or avert:
[L]arge-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with geno-
cidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate
state action, state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state
situation; or
* [L]arge-scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror,
or rape, or any combination thereof.39
Indeed this threshold is vital to human protection, but the report does
not go far enough. First, it does not quantify in legal or sociopolitical
terms what is meant by a "large-scale loss of life" or "ethnic cleansing."
Nor does the report suggest standards for objectively evaluating such
conditions. This raises the following question: If prevention is the single
most important dimension of the responsibility to protect, is it not con-
tradictory to require "large-scale loss of life" before saving lives? 4 As
one analyst points out, this raises a secondary issue: "[W]ho[m] would
we trust to provide an objective assessment of [the] likelihood" of such a
loss of life.8 ' Second, the report's threshold does not include two vital
jus cogens norms: systematic racial discrimination and massive human
rights violations.42 Furthermore, it does not consider or even mention a
third important emerging norm, against toppling democratically elected
or legitimate governments. The UN, ECOWAS, and Organization of Af-
rican Unity's condemnation of the overthrow of the democratically
elected government in Sierra Leone in 1997, which was thereafter re-
versed by a universally supported Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention, is
a prominent example. The latter points are crucial because the African
region has "codified" these thresholds for intervention, as well as others,
at both the regional (ECOWAS and SADC) and continental levels (AU),
and addressed the three aforementioned situations that have been con-
sciously ignored by the ICISS (see Table III).
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id.
40. See Weiss, supra note 5, at 148.
41. Welsh, supra note 13, at 498.
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987); see also
Princz v. F.R.G., 26 E3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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TABLE III.
THRESHOLDS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
Responsibility to Protect
* Large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which
is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or
a failed state situation; or
* Large-scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended, whether carried out by the
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.
AU Constitutive Act and AUPSC 3
* In respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and
instruments"; or
* Institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes
place in a member state, as provided in the Lomd Declaration."5
ECOWAS Mechanism
* In cases of aggression or conflict in any member state or threat thereof;
" In case of conflict between two or several member states; and
* In case of internal conflict:
(a) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster; or
(b) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the subregion.
* In event of serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law.
" In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected
government.'
43. See Jeremy Levitt, The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 13(1)
IOWA J. TRANSNAT'L & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (forthcoming Dec. 2003), for more on the
African Union Peace and Security Council.
44. See AU Protocol, supra note 33, art. 7(e).
45. Id., art. 7(g).
46. ECOWAS Mechanism, supra note 33, art. 25, at 274.
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SADC Mechanism
-The organ may seek to resolve any significant interstate conflict between the
signatories or between a signatory and another state.
A "significant inter-state conflict" shall include:
(a) a conflict over territorial boundaries or natural resources;
(b) a conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has
occurred or been threatened; and
(c) a conflict that threatens peace and security in the region or in a signatory
that is not a party to the conflict.
* The organ may seek to resolve any significant intrastate conflict with a signatory,
A "significant intra-state conflict" shall include:
(a) large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the
state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing,
and gross violation of human rights;"
(b) a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a state;
(c) a condition of civil war or insurgency; and
(d) a conflict that threatens peace and security in the region or in another
member state."
The ICISS thresholds for intervention are apparently more conserva-
tive than those of African states, but perhaps not more so than those of
Asian and Latin America states, which historically are among the
staunchest subscribers to the international law principles of noninterven-
tion and state sovereignty. This fact is somewhat shocking because it
means that the report is "less evolved" than the law de lege lata in the
Africa region, home to the bulk of the world's civil wars with which the
report was preoccupied. What did African states know or understand that
the internationalist-minded ICISS did not? Perhaps, it is not that the
ICISS was behind but that the law jus ad bellum in Africa is more ad-
vanced than, and arguably inconsistent with, the law de lege lata outside
of Africa, which the ICISS was primarily concerned.
The ICISS's precautionary principles are drawn from "just war" doc-
trine and are generally uncontestable. They serve as a basic but sound
framework to assess the legal and political efficacy of intervention. The
principles are:
Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever
other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert hu-
man suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral
47. SADC Mechanism, supra note 33, art. 11(2)(b).
48. Id.
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operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims con-
cerned.
Last resort: Military intervention can be justified only when every
nonmilitary option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis
has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser meas-
ures would not have succeeded.
Proportional means: The scale, duration, and intensity of the
planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to se-
cure the defined human protection objective.
Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success
in halting or averting the suffering that has justified the intervention,
with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the conse-
quences of inaction.
Although "just war" doctrine forms the backbone of these principles,
they also seem to include peacekeeping doctrine that has emerged out of
state practice since the end of the Cold War. In this context, the first and
second elements are the most relevant. The recognition in the "right in-
tention" principle that states often have mixed motives for intervening to
end human suffering, and that regional and local opinion is critical to the
success of any enforcement operations, is refreshing. The "reasonable
prospects" element is unique because it reemphasizes the importance of
states to assess thoroughly the situations in target states before interven-
ing with reasonable prospects of doing more good than harm. The ICISS
could have paid more attention to the role of military technology, par-
ticularly surveillance and air power, in ascertaining or informing the
"reasonable means" and "proportional means" principles.
The issue of "right authority" is by far the most important issue in
the humanitarian intervention debate. It is on this issue that the unwill-
ingness of the UNSC to take decisive action gravely affected the fates of
millions of people in Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Congo, Kosovo,
and East Timor. The ICISS position on the question of "right authority"
is disappointing and inconsistent with emerging norms of international
law. The "right authority" principles set out in the report are:
1) There is no better or more appropriate body than the United
Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention
for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alterna-
tives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to
make the Security Council work better.
2) Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought
prior to carrying out any military intervention action. Those
calling for an intervention should formally request such
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authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own
initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article
99 of the UN Charter.
3) The Security Council should deal promptly with any request
for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large-
scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this
context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on
the ground that might support a military intervention.
4) The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should
agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vi-
tal interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of
resolutions authorizing military intervention for human pro-
tection purposes for which there is otherwise majority
support.
5) If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with
it in a reasonable time, alternative options are:
a) Consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in
Emergency Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace"
procedure; and
b) Action within area of jurisdiction by regional or subre-
gional organizations under Chapter VII of the charter,
subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the
Security Council.
6) The Security Council should take into account in all its delib-
erations the fact that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility
to protect in conscience-shocking situations demanding ac-
tion, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet
the gravity and urgency of that situation-and that the stature
and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.
The ICISS's determination that there is no "more appropriate" body
than the UNSC to authorize military interventions and that prior authori-
zation "should be sought in all cases" is difficult to accept, given the
Security Council's history of allowing literally millions of people to die
and numerous states to collapse between the years 1990 and 2003. 49 The
49. The bulk of deaths have taken place in Africa, specifically, the Congo (estimated 3
million), Sudan (estimated 2 million), Rwanda (estimated 1 million), Burundi (estimated
300,000) and Liberia (estimated 250,000). GLOBAL: Terrorism shifts attention from civilians
in conflicts-OXFAM, Integrated Regional Information Networks (Sept. 16, 2003) at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=36629&SelectRegion=Global&SelectCountry=
GLOBAL (last visited Dec. 8, 2003).
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first assertion on appropriateness contradicts case studies in the Supple-
mentary Volume that clearly highlight the tension between UN law,
namely, prohibitions against uses of force against states under Article
2(4) of the Charter, and emerging customary international law and bind-
ing treaty-based justifications for intervention. ° The second assertion on
"prior authorization" is almost ludicrous, considering that the UNSC
itself has authorized several interventions and codeployed forces in op-
erations taken outside of the Charter framework.5' Such actions arguably
have weakened the principle of nonintervention that allows for custom-
ary international law and treaty-based remedies when the UNSC fails to
maintain international peace and security and/or reasonably respond to
situations causing large-scale loss of life.
Although the ICISS calls on the UNSC to "deal promptly with any
request for authority to intervene," it seems to ignore the Security Coun-
cil's history, which Rwandans know all too well. The fact that the ICISS
deemed it necessary to include principles suggesting that UNSC's per-
manent members not use their veto powers to "obstruct" the passing of
resolutions designed to protect people and to "deal promptly" with re-
quests, speaks volumes about the UNSC, especially since these very
same "principles" formed the logic underpinning debates around UNSC
powers in San Francisco in 1945.
The ICISS's solution to the problem of UNSC inaction does not
create a "dam of protection" but rather a conceptual quagmire. First, if
the commission is correct in its contention that countries in regions are
best suited to enforce peace and "have a greater stake in overseeing a
return to peace and prosperity" in their own regions,52 it seems
contradictory to argue that regional organizations should, in the absence
of UNSC action, seek prior, if any, authorization from the UNGA under
the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. If countries within regions are "more
sensitive to the issues and context behind ... conflict" and "more
familiar with the actors and personalities involved [in a] conflict," then
logic follows that they should be most qualified to make informed
50. See THOMAS G. WEISS ET AL., THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIB-
LIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 166-170 (Supp. Vol. to THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 2001).
The author served as a reader/writer the supplementary volume of the report.
51. Id. See Jeremy Levitt, The Evolving Intervention Regime in Africa: From Basket
Case to Market Place?, 96 ASIL PRoc. 136-143 (2002); Jeremy Levitt, African Intervention-
ist States and International Law, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES (Oliver Furley & Roy
May eds., 2001); Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal
Conflicts: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L. J.
333 (1998).
52. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at 54.
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decisions about intervention.53 To assert as the ICISS does that regional
organizations "always" must receive prior authorization from the UNSC
before intervention and simultaneously contend that there "may be
certain leeway for future action" of regional organizations to take
unilateral action and seek ex post facto authorization from the UNSC
(e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau) 4 is contradictory and
confusing. The failure of the ICISS to clearly articulate a doctrine of
intervention as a result of UNSC inaction is problematic; it adds
ambiguity to an already foggy issue. The ICISS perhaps unwittingly
suggests carving out an "ex post facto exception" to the principle of
nonintervention, thereby undermining its own proposition that the UNSC
is the only "right authority."
To its credit, the commission recognized that UN inaction in the face
of "conscience-shocking situations" has and will continue to lead to uni-
lateral action (absent UN authority) by states, action that ultimately
harms the credibility and stature of the UN. The commission also cau-
tions that unilateral interventions by ad hoc coalitions or individual
states, "without the discipline and constraints of UN authorization, will
not be conducted for the right reasons or with the right commitment to
the necessary precautionary principles."" However, several UN-
sanctioned operations have apparently disregarded the human rights pro-
tective regime and UN peacekeeping doctrine. On this issue, one analyst
comments:
It seems that every peacekeeping operation has had its share of
horror stories: U.S. soldiers offending Muslim values by skinny-
dipping in Somalia [and operating outside of the UN mandate to
'arrest' Mohamed Farah Aidid, the chief Somali warlord]; Cana-
dians torturing and murdering Somali civilians; Dutch
peacekeepers 'luring Bosnian children into a field to check for
landmines by throwing sweets into the area'; and UNTAC's
53. Id. If the UN General Assembly authorization under the "Uniting for Peace" resolu-
tion is the most effective response to Security Council inaction, perhaps it is time for the
UNGA to adopt a "Uniting for Peace II" resolution that empowers it to authorize interventions
by regional organizations or permit them to seek ex post facto authorization from the UNGA
when UNSC refuses to act and there is large-scale human suffering. This would provide addi-
tional legitimacy for regional organizations, enable the UNGA to shape customary law use-of-
force developments and make definitive pronouncements on the legality and legitimacy of
interventions-rather than UN authority being 'usurped' by extra-Charter state practice and
treaty law developments.
54. Id.
55. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at 55.
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Bulgarian contingent becoming involved in prostitution and
smuggling.56
Conversely, examples of interventions by ad hoc coalitions and indi-
vidual states that arguably have been both popular (domestically and
internationally) and effective include the Mission for the Implementation
of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic in
1996,"7 and Guinea's and Senegal's intervention to thwart a military mu-
tiny and attempted coup d'6tat in Guinea-Bissau in 1998 . When taken
together, the law jus ad bellum in Africa, derived from state practice and
treaty law developments, illustrates that indeed it is possible to find con-
sensus around a set of proposals for military intervention that
acknowledge[s] the validity of intervention "not authorized by the Secu-
rity Council or General Assembly." '59
The last topic examined in the ICISS report relates to "Operational
Principles." This section discusses the operational dimension of the
gamut of military operations available to states to protect vulnerable
populations, from preventive deployments and robust military action to
post-conflict reconstruction. In this section the Commission wisely ar-
gues that "the responsibility to protect means that human protection
operations will be different from both the traditional operational con-
cepts for individual states waging war and for UN peacekeeping
operations."'6 In addition, it advocates for the need to adopt a more flexi-
ble doctrine and "proceed from the fundamental thesis... that any
coercive intervention for human protection purposes is but one element
in a continuum of intervention, which begins with preventive efforts and
ends with the responsibility to rebuild.' It makes the case that any such
doctrine should be based on these principles:
1) Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times;
and resources to match.
2) Common military approach among involved partners; unity of
command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain
of command.
56. Duane Bratt, Peace Over Justice: Developing a Framework for UN Peacekeeping
Operations in Internal Conflicts, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 63, 72 (1999).
57. Levitt, African Interventionist States and International Law, supra note 51, at 31-
35.
58. Id. at 26-31.
59. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 2, at 54-55.
60. Id. at 66.
61. Id. at 66-67.
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3) Acceptance of limitations; incrementalism and gradualism in
the application of force, the objective being protection of a
population, not defeat of a state.
4) Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are
precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve
total adherence to international humanitarian law.
5) Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal
objective.
6) Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organiza-
tions.
Few military officials, policymakers, or scholars would quarrel with
this comprehensive list of operating principles. The notion of a new and
more holistic operations doctrine based on the "responsibility to protect"
is a welcome development. Although it would be an enormous challenge
for the UN to design a one-size-fits-all doctrine, the cases of:
Cambodia and Angola provide classic examples of the acquies-
cent approach, while Somalia and, to an extent, Bosnia are
examples of attempted coercion. Regional and UN operations in
West Africa [Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and
C6te d' Ivoire] have been characterized by a perplexing admix-
ture of coercion and acquiescence, while the approach to
disarmament and security challenges in Rwanda defies logic.
62
Here it is crucial to heed the warning of Thomas Weiss:
The responsibility to protect civilians presents many challenging
tasks that are not favored by militaries around the world. Buried
in that famous 'grey area' [between compelling compliance and
coercive protection] are thus a host of challenges: the forcible
disarmament of belligerents (especially in refugee camps like
those in eastern Zaire); the meaningful protection of safe areas
(the gruesome example of Srebrenica comes immediately to
mind); and the protection of humanitarian workers (as Fred
Cuny and other expatriate officials would testify if they were
alive) .63
From this background, the ICISS recommendations to the UN Secretary-
General on the operational dimension are sound and, if followed,
62. Id. at 66.
63. Weiss, supra note 5, at 152.
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certainly would be a giant step in creating a "dam of protection" to
which populations in harm's way are rightly entitled.
III. CONCLUSION
The ICISS report is innovative. It makes a compelling case for shift-
ing the focus of the notion of humanitarian intervention from the rights
of interveners to the rights of at-risk populations and the "duty" of states
to protect them. The report maintains that state authorities are ultimately
responsible for protecting their citizens from serious harm and that when
they are unable or unwilling to do so, the principle of nonintervention is
trumped by the international responsibility to protect. In this context, as
Weiss contends, "the three traditional characteristics of a state in the
Westphalian system (territory, authority, population) are supplemented
by a fourth (respect for human rights)."6
The Responsibility to Protect report proffers a comprehensive and
holistic approach to peacemaking, including the responsibilities to pre-
vent, to react, and to rebuild. Its approach is not new-African regional
organizations have been operating under parallel paradigms for several
years-yet in the context of the law jus ad bellum, these three responsi-
bilities broaden and even "humanize" the humanitarian intervention
debate-advocating for a continuum of action. However, the ICISS fails
to suggest ways to encourage state authorities to act on these responsi-
bilities or to evolve from a "culture of reaction" to a "culture of
prevention," which it deems the most important dimension of its report,
when the general practice of most states is to do the "minimum" at times
when no overriding strategic interests are involved. The Responsibility to
Protect does not provide a practical framework (not that I necessarily
claim that any exists) to prompt governments to take action when they
possess credible information that deadly civil conflict will ensue or mas-
sive human rights violations will be committed (remember Rwanda).
Principles by themselves have little utility if they cannot be applied
pragmatically, which ultimately takes resources and will, essential ele-
ments for constructing a beaver dam.
While the ICISS should be commended for boldly forwarding a "neo
just war" doctrine and "just cause" thresholds for intervention to protect
vulnerable populations, the thresholds seemingly do not comport with
the law de lege lata, as they exclude specific reference to systematic ra-
cial discrimination and massive human rights violations, and the
emerging norm against toppling democratically elected or legitimate
64. Id. at 153.
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governments. Here the report fails adequately to consider state practice
and treaty law developments in Africa and emerging democratic govern-
ance norms in Africa and Latin America, which is disappointing
considering that the Supplementary Volume includes numerous case
studies of interventions in these regions.
The Commission's insistence that the United Nations Security
Council is the only "right authority" to authorize military intervention is
also problematic, given the inaction and ineffectiveness of the UNSC
and its practice of authorizing interventions ex post facto and codeploy-
ing forces in operations taken outside of the Charter's framework. It
follows that the Responsibility to Protect, in my view, mistakenly hinges
its sovereignty-as-responsibility approach on 1) the willingness of the
UNSC to act, the systematic failure of which prompted the inquiry lead-
ing to the report itself, and 2) the Commission's recommendation for
extra-UNSC approaches ('Uniting for Peace' procedure and Chapter VIII
ex post facto authorization) to protect vulnerable populations. From this
background did the ICISS meet the challenge of UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to the United Nations General Assembly to avert "another
Rwanda" by forging a new consensus on humanitarian intervention? As
mentioned above, the conceptual and practical problems with the
ICISS's approach to protecting at-risk populations when the UNSC fails
to do so does not create a "dam of protection," but rather creates a
swamp. Notwithstanding, the "Uniting for Peace" procedure and the
"Chapter VIII ex post facto" approach put forth by the Commission are
legally ambiguous and weak.
The work of the ICISS must be reassessed on the issue of "just
cause" and "right authority." In the meantime, the Responsibility to Pro-
tect does not offer a strong "dam of protection" for people suffering
actual or apprehended large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing. None-
theless, the "dam of protection" that it does provide is somewhat more
substantial than other paradigms. Although it may be true that weak
dams are better than none at all, relatively feeble dams, like that offered
in the Responsibility to Protect, often are swept away by strong currents,
leaving the beaver, or in this case at-risk populations, to struggle for sur-
vival in dangerous conditions. The world's suffering masses deserve a
comprehensive and holistic normative framework of protection-built of
strong sticks and thick mud, not twigs and thin sludge. How many more
millions of people must die before the international community led by
the Permanent Five decides that the "responsibility to protect" is a global
imperative? Arguably, Canada, the sponsor of the ICISS, has not decided
this question in the affirmative considering that only 20 out of 3,745 Ca-
nadian peacekeeping troops worldwide are involved in operations in
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Africa where,65 as the Responsibility to Protect rightly acknowledges, the
bulk of internal conflict and human suffering has taken place in recent
years. Did Canada fulfill its "responsibility to protect" Liberians when
Liberia degenerated into violent conflict in 2003?
65. See Government of Canada, Current Operations, at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/
operations/currentops-e.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2003).
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